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Abstract 
Many “Emerging Powers” that have recently assumed a more important international role have significantly 
increased their economic activities in Africa. These new development partners have shown a substantial increase 
in their development cooperation activities. Since the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China–Africa Co-
operation in 2006, China's renewed interest in Africa has garnered a lot of attention and generated a lot of debate. 
Western media and analysts have perhaps not surprisingly been generally very critical of China’s rising influence 
in Africa. The African reaction, however, has been more mixed. African leaders have welcomed what they see as 
a new approach to development and increased potential for meaningful South–South co-operation. With the 
strengthening of China's aid to Africa; there has been concern regarding the effectiveness of aid in Africa. 
Despite the fact that through China's aid and FDI, a great achievement of poverty reduction in Africa has been 
made, recent evidence from both China and Africa shows that there are still numerous problems in China's aid.  
To clarify the characteristic and dilemma of China’s aid, Ethiopia is selected as the pointcut in this paper for its 
intimate relationship with China, who has a lot of cooperation with china and accepted lots of China’s aid. The 
present study indicates that the development assistances from China to Ethiopia, has a direct and indirect impact 
which is at the same time complimentary and competitive to western aid, and thus have both opportunities and 
challenges. In this light, we also recommend policy interventions to minimize the challenges and maximize the 
benefits of the cooperation, which can be implemented unilaterally by Ethiopia and also by the Chinese as well 
as through the cooperation. The paper concludes, China seem to have found a way of peaceful coexistence with 
Western donors in offering assistance to Africa, giving priority to our own projects, with the adherence to the 
principles of ‘recipient responsibility’ and ‘local ownership’. 
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1.Introduction  
In the last two decades, Africa has grown robustly—performance that lies in stark contrast to the “growth 
tragedy” of 1980s. Take the figure 1 in the website of World Bank as an example, the statistics of data suggest 
that life standard of African people has becoming better and poverty in Africa has been reduced. In the past 
decades, poverty rate of Africa has been on the decline. The proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day 
in Southern, East, Central and West Africa decreased from 56.5 percent in 1990 to 48.5 percent in 2010. In the 
same period, the population in Africa increased by 65.08 percent from 0.63 billion to 1.04 billion. Despite the 
drop-in poverty rate, the total number of African people (excluding North Africa) living below the poverty line 
($1.25 per day) increased from 290 million in 1990 to 376 million (1999) and 414 million (2010). 
Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa’s Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day 
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Figure 1: Poverty Ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Source: World Bank, 2013 
On the other hand, over the past few decades, China has experienced a fundamental transformation of aid 
                                                           
1 Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University 
2 International Relations, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University 
3 International Relations, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University 
4 International Relations, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University 
5 International Relations, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.59, 2017 
 
2 
policy from a net donor to a net recipient and to an emerging donor again. From 2000 to 2011, Chinese total 
financial commitments to Africa reached $73 billion, significantly higher than the official figure of foreign aid of 
$15 billion (Strange et al. 2013). Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s trade and investment to Africa 
have also grown exponentially. FDI inflows surged from $75 million in 2000 to $3.2 billion in 2014 (MOFCOM 
2015). With an average of 30% of annual trade growth between China and Africa in the last 15 years, China has 
become Africa’s largest trading partner and stood at $180 billion in 2015 (UN Comtrade 2016). Despite the 
growing importance of China as a major source of FDI and a provider of foreign aid in Africa, China’s foreign 
aid policy is still not widely understood and its impact on African development is controversial. Rather than join 
the established aid regime under the framework of official development assistance (ODA), China has been 
promoting the integration of aid and investment, often through bilateral partnership agreements with African 
countries. 
One key criticism against China’s aid policy is its strong selfish motivation that puts its own political and 
economic interests ahead of recipients’ priorities of economic development, and is thus characterized as “rogue 
aid” (Naim 2007). Although this exaggerated or even fraudulent claim cannot be justified (Dreher and Fuchs 
2015), how to characterize the emerging Chinese model of development cooperation is still a challenging task. 
Could it evolve to be a viable alternative to the existing ODA model? Comparing two project-level aid and 
investment datasets, this paper shows that while both Chinese aid and investment flows increased steadily over 
time, their correlation is not as strong as expected, in terms of both geographical and sectoral distribution. It 
suggests that China has not developed a consistent and coherent strategy of integrating aid and investment. 
Instead, it is profit-driven firms that use various aid schemes as a launching pad to implement their investment 
projects. While large SOEs still dominate large infrastructure projects, smaller and heterogeneous firms are 
increasingly involved in the aid-investment-trade trinity in Africa. 
China’s extensive use of aid for trade and investment has challenged the established ODA norm on tied aid. 
Despite the concern on aid effectiveness, improving and facilitating synergy between aid and investment has 
advantages that may lead to a more effective partnership between donor and recipient countries. With their rising 
role as infrastructure investors in Africa, Chinese firms are more exposed to structural vulnerability than are 
investors in other sectors. The success of their projects is particularly sensitive to the stability of the recipient 
country’s institutional and regulatory environment. While China continues to emphasize the “no-strings-
attached” principle in its aid policy, it has to pay more attention to domestic affairs in the recipient countries, 
though there is no evidence that Chinese aid is tied with the regime type in recipient countries (Strange et al 
2015). The implications of this paper challenge a long-standing perspective about China’s economic statecraft 
that with its rising economic clout in the international system, China is more capable of leveraging its economic 
power to realize strategic and diplomatic objectives (Reilly 2013, Norris 2016). This paper suggests, however, 
that there are competing actors, interests, and agendas that influence China’s aid policy. In particular, Chinese 
companies, regardless of their ownership structure, can use aid schemes to advance their commercial interests, 
which may create unintended consequences on foreign policy objectives. 
In the paper, we will discuss China’s assistance in Africa with reference to Ethiopia, at the beginning of 
assistance, China did not get much material benefits from Ethiopia. Especially, I want to pay attention to the 
potential impact of China’s involvement in Africa on reduction of poverty. In the last two decades, Africa has 
grown robustly—performance that lies in stark contrast to the “growth tragedy” of 1980s. According to World 
Bank statistics, life standard of African people has becoming better and poverty in Africa has been reduced. The 
poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1990 was 54.3%, while in 2013, the percentage 
reduced to 41%. After 20 years of efforts, the poverty rate in Ethiopia has fallen from 69.26 in 1981 to 33.54 in 
2010 (World Bank, 2013). This success is somewhat as a result of China’s presence in Africa Thus, with the 
strengthening of China's aid to Africa, the effectiveness of aid has been more and more concerned. Despite the 
fact that through China's aid, Africa in poverty reduction has been made a great achievement, there are still many 
problems in both China and Africa. The article will mainly discuss the case of Ethiopia, through the case, we 
will be more comprehensive understanding of China's poverty reduction in Africa play an important role. 
 
2. Motives of Chinese aid policy 
Like established donors, China also justifies its overseas economic activities with development objectives that it 
helps developing countries to promote sustainable economic development and poverty reduction, but such 
development objectives have often been subordinated to strategic, diplomatic, or commercial considerations. 
There are three major perspectives on the motives of China’s development cooperation strategy. The first 
perspective maintains that the spike of China’s foreign aid has been driven primarily by Beijing’s desire to 
secure strategic resources—those most fundamental to national security—and secondarily for diplomatic reasons 
(Lum et al. 2009). As an emerging superpower, China will ultimately challenge the established international aid 
regime and subsequently build alternative aid model (Reilly 2013). China is more capable to leverage its 
economic power to realize political and strategic objectives, but the success of Chinese economic statecraft 
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depends partly on the ability of the state to control the behavior of commercial actors (Norris 2016). The 
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), and the 
‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative could be examples of this view. 
The second perspective suggests that the Chinese aid policy has always maintained its distance from the 
established aid model under the guidance of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and will not 
necessarily challenge the existing international aid regime (Brautigam 2009). Through a careful examination of 
Chinese zone programs in Africa, Brautigam and Tang (2012) find that China’s overseas economic activities are 
driven by strategic consideration, but not as a means to boost China’s resource security. Chinese companies were 
encouraged to comply with the state’s strategic objectives, but they were not pushed to move against their long-
term commercial interests. The third perspective argues that China does not have a coherent aid strategy that is 
carefully designed and implemented (Varrall 2015). The Chinese aid policy is often contested by diplomatic and 
commercial agendas. The diplomatic agenda regards aid as an instrument for exercising diplomatic influence on 
the international stage and deepening cooperation with selected countries whereas the commercial agenda views 
aid as a useful way of assisting domestic businesses to ‘go international’ and expand exports and investments. 
The dual agendas, though not necessarily conflictual, indicate an underlying competition for influence by 
different government agencies, particularly between the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA). Recent research suggests, however, that Chinese aid is not strongly correlated with 
recipients’ endowments of natural resources and institutional characteristics (Dreher and Fuchs 2015). Strange et 
al. (2015) find that the allocation of Chinese ODA is driven primarily by foreign policy considerations whereas 
economic interests better explain the distribution of less concessional forms of Chinese official finance. 
While all these perspectives differ in their focuses on the objectives of China’s development cooperation 
strategy, they all note a distinct feature of China’s aid pattern. Chinese overseas economic activities often come 
as a package with a mixture of aid and investment. It is virtually impossible to unbundle what constitutes 
Chinese aid and FDI. For example, in 2015, China pledged $60 billion in development assistance to Africa. Of 
the $60 billion package, only $5 billion will fit the OECD criteria of ODA as it will come as grants and interest-
free loans. The rest of the flows will arrive as loans and export credits (Robertson and Benabdallah 2016). 
Several factors may contribute to this distinct characteristic. First, the Chinese definition of foreign aid is 
significantly different from the OECD’s definition of ODA. In China, the term “foreign aid” refers to those 
activities which provide economic, technical, material, human resources, and administrative support to recipient 
countries, supported by the Chinese government's “financial resources for foreign aid.” While the forms of 
foreign aid include grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans, the proportion of grant is much lower than 
standard ODA, which should contain a grant element of at least 25% (Strange et al. 2015). 
Second, China’s aid giving has been guided by the principle of “equality and mutual benefit”, indicating 
that the interplay of aid and FDI in international development cooperation is a default arrangement. Capital flows 
from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are particularly difficult to identify clearly as investments or aid-like state 
finance. Early Chinese multinational companies (MNCs) are predominantly state-owned and backed by strong 
state support. For the most part, SOEs, particularly those controlled by the central government, still enjoy access 
to capital on preferential terms from within the Chinese economy. 
Third, Chinese aid and FDI activities are supervised by two sub-divisions in the same ministry—the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). The Department of Aid to Foreign Countries (DAFC) is in charge of aid 
affairs and the Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation (EBIEC) is in charge of investment 
affairs. This institutional arrangement facilitates the integration and coordination between aid and investment 
projects. Two other related ministries are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF). MFA works with MOFCOM in shaping specific aid packages and commitments. MOF drafts China’s 
foreign aid budget in consultation with MOFCOM and MFA. 
Moreover, data availability and compatibility impose tremendous challenges to separate aid and FDI. Due 
to lack of specific aid information, the estimates of Chinese aid vary widely. The estimates of the total amount of 
Chinese aid between 2001 and 2012, for example, range 7 from $8.5 billion by the OECD DAC and $670 billion 
by the Rand Corporation2 (Wolf et al. 2013). Other estimates of China’s ODA and ODA-like financing are much 
higher than the official statistics, but their methods are noticeably different, highlighting the data incompatibility 
problem (Kitano and Harada 2015, Strange et al. 2013). The huge variations across these studies owe much to 
the way China finances its overseas projects. The Eximbank and the China Development Bank (CDB) provide an 
intermediation function between financial markets and recipient countries based on a mechanism of sovereign 
guaranteed repayment of loans and market access for Chinese companies. While the Eximbank’s concessional 
loans do not fall into the categories of trade, investment, or aid, they in fact demonstrate characteristics of all 
three because Chinese aid is often part of larger package of investment involving export promotion (Corkin 
2013). 
China’s OFDI data is equally murky. The official FDI statistics, published by MOFCOM, have only 
country-year aggregate information since 2003, but they do not have detailed information on sectors, firms, and 
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projects. Some other popular databases on Chinese OFDI projects focus on developed countries and collect only 
large M&A cases, but their methodologies and coverage are also often challenged.1  
 
3. Is the Chinese Aid Model Alleviating Poverty? 
China as a provider of foreign aid is particularly interesting as it is both a developed and a developing country. 
Indeed, despite its stupendous economic achievements in the last decade or so, widespread poverty, 
environmental concerns and increasing levels of inequality within China remain a major concern. These may in 
turn partly explain the Chinese government’s lack of transparency on its foreign aid policies, as the topic remains 
a sensitive one at home. The modalities of Chinese aid are neither singular nor static, and aid policies and 
practices in Africa are constantly changing. For example, China generally claims to achieve ‘development 
effectiveness’ – whether its assistance can meet the urgent needs of economic growth of, and employment in, 
recipient countries – rather than ‘aid effectiveness’. And the rhetoric characterizing the aid discourse has 
emphasised ‘zero self-interest’, ‘no privileges’ for Chinese expatriates and business houses; ‘non-
interventionism’ or non-attachment of political conditions; and ‘maximum satisfaction of local needs’. 
The lack of transparency of China’s aid policies and programmes2 has, however, resulted in numerous 
misunderstandings in the Global North. 3 For example, a large majority of the country’s officially supported 
finance (e.g. export credits, non-concessional state loans or aid used to foster Chinese investments) does not fall 
into the OECD-DAC definition of official development assistance (ODA). Indeed, a relatively small amount of 
finance provided by China meets ODA criteria.4 The boundaries between official and private entities in China 
remain blurred and some scholars have suggested that we should pay greater attention to identifying the patterns 
of relationships between various actors involved in foreign aid within China.5 
Some scholars have also highlighted the growing tension between the state-centric principles that have 
been the foundation of Chinese foreign policy since the 1950s and the so-called ‘new types of strategic 
partnership’ that China wishes to promote with Africa. They note the increasing dissonance between 
the principles of non-interference and non-conditionality and a relationship with Africa that is 
characterized by a growing complexity, driven by the tendency to deal with ruling elites and the 
unintended consequences that arise from the presence of an expanding number of Chinese actors.6 
And although many other actors (e.g. India, Brazil and the Global North) face similar challenges, China is 
very keen to highlight that its partnership with aid recipient governments and the projects it implements in Africa 
are not only different, but considerably better than those of the Global North. Despite this somewhat isolationist 
approach, there is some indication at least from the Ethiopian case that China is perhaps more interested today 
than a few years ago in joining forces at some level with the international development regimes such as the 
OECD-DAC. However, the real impetus for such involvement will probably only come about if African states 
that receive begin expressing widespread dissatisfaction with the Chinese model of trade, investments and aid. 
In a world still struggling to cope with the effects of the recent finance and food crises, there has been 
considerable speculation in the media and in international policy circles regarding a perceived ‘threat to aid’. 
Some argue that the current system – dominated by numerous governmental and non-governmental agencies 
supported by Western donors – appears dysfunctional, fragmented and duplicative. 7  Climate change, 
competition for resources, and the growing influence of ‘new donors’ (especially China) in the post-Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) phase – together with decreasing levels of aid from the Global North – will, 
according to this line of argument, pose numerous challenges for the so called ‘harmonization’ and coordination 
of aid, but also the manner in which aid is targeted at improving the lives of people living in poverty around the 
world. Some of these issues were discussed in the recently adopted Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation, which emphasizes ownership of development priorities by developing countries, a focus on results, 
inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and accountability to each other.8 However, the extent to 
which such principles are adopted in practice will be interesting to observe in the immediate future. 
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It appears, however, beyond doubt that the principles on which Chinese development assistance to Africa is 
based, vary considerably from OECD countries, even though it is programmed in similar ways – for example 
though project support, technical assistance, food aid, debt relief, humanitarian assistance, etc. 1The Chinese 
model relies on a combination of economic cooperation, trade and investments together with an emphasis on 
non-interference and mutual benefit. 2 And the Ethiopian case illustrates this rather well. The major differences, 
however, relate to country assistance strategies, basket financing of sectors, budget support and political 
conditionality (crucial for OECD, but largely absent in Chinese assistance other than expectation of support to 
the One-China policy) and the Chinese emphasis on ‘prestige’ and turnkey infrastructure projects (e.g. 
government buildings, stadiums) that do not overstretch the weak capacity of African bureaucracies such as the 
one in Ethiopia. Similarly, while the OECD countries focus on social sectors, emphasize the role of primary 
education and consider development aid to be crucial for economic development, the Chinese rely on 
infrastructure and productive activities, give several thousand University scholarships to African students every 
year and consider investments and infrastructure to be the main ingredients and drivers of development within a 
country. 
Some Western aid agencies, journalists and civil society organisations in Ethiopia argue that the Chinese 
are not focused on poverty, but rather on economic development that is broad-based and the result of commercial 
activity. The official statements from the Chinese do not seem to entirely substantiate this line of argument. For 
example, in the period September-December 2009, officials of the Chinese embassy explicitly mentioned 
‘poverty reduction’ and China’s support in Ethiopia’s ‘fight against poverty for prosperity for the Ethiopian 
people’ in many of their interactions with Ethiopian officials, civil society organisations and the media. However, 
the goal of poverty reduction was rather unsurprisingly always spoken together with a focus on trade and 
commerce for development. For example, within the field of agriculture the aim is not to fund subsidies but to 
develop commercial farms and large-scale plantation of cotton, sugarcane, coffee and other cash crops. 
Nonetheless, this does not stop other aid officials with long track records in Ethiopia from questioning the 
usefulness of hotels and conference centres that the Chinese have prioritised. A frequently heard observation 
from Western diplomats and UN organisations is, ‘China is doing what we used to do in the 1970s and 1980s’. 
The criticism here is that the potential for tourism is limited and there is generally a problem of over-capacity in 
terms of hotel accommodation in the country’s capital. Moreover, some representatives of civil society 
organisations wonder how the Ethiopian government will be able to maintain these enormously expensive 
buildings in the near future. 
According to the China Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, China funds a whole range of activities in 
Africa. As in Ethiopia, Chinese assistance to other countries include turn-key projects (construction of bridges, 
stadiums, government-run factories), technical cooperation projects (teams from China provide advice, on-site 
training and ‘learning by doing’), material goods (usually as a grant), general humanitarian aid or disaster relief, 
training programmes (formal courses, short and medium term, including seminars on development management 
and auditing, usually held in China), concessional loan projects (higher technology exports or construction 
projects developed by Chinese companies and financed through China Eximbank with low, fixed-rate loans). 
According to several informants in China, the underlying Chinese strategy on poverty reduction in all of the 
above is focused on local employment generation and improvement of livelihoods. In addition to the large 
infrastructure projects currently being constructed in the country, a major focus of China’s long-term strategy in 
Ethiopia has been the establishment of economic and technical zones and industrial parks that will help 
strengthen local industry, increase the added value of products, and stimulate exports – that in turn will create 
more jobs. 
A more indirect focus on poverty reduction is borne out of China’s belief that with the import of cheap but 
reliable consumer products to Ethiopia from China, ordinary citizens will have access to goods that otherwise 
would not be affordable. This would in turn help improve the livelihoods of the poor. The counter argument to 
this is, of course, the gradual increase in hostility shown to Chinese traders doing business in rural parts of 
Ethiopia selling cheaper products made in China.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese perspective is that by encouraging and supporting large Chinese enterprises to 
invest in Ethiopia – particularly in the areas of agriculture, food processing and manufacturing – the aim is to 
generate new forms of employment in rural and urban areas. In the past few years, there has been some evidence 
of such a strategy making a difference, especially in the fields of cotton plantation and processing. China also 
wishes to encourage Ethiopian businesses to explore business opportunities in China, although most local 
businessmen prefer to import Chinese products for the Ethiopian market rather than try their hands at exporting 
local goods to an unknown Chinese market. In many African countries – with a strong Chinese presence – 
African traders now routinely travel to Guangzhou and other manufacturing centres in China in order to make 
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bulk orders of goods that they can introduce to their local markets. This also appears to be the case in Ethiopian 
where the owners of small local businesses often travel to China. However, it is unclear the type of assistance 
and facilities such local Ethiopian businesses potentially receive from Chinese authorities if they show interest in 
exporting their products on their own to China, i.e. without involving a Chinese intermediary or a partner. And 
despite several visits to China by business delegations, we are not aware of any major collaboration that has been 
initiated by Ethiopian companies in China. 
China has frequently emphasized its model of development is built on hard work, modesty and self-
development, facilitated by social and political stability and without too much external assistance or interference. 
The message imparted has often been that it is not the country that is poor, but the people and the ‘remaining 
poor is not in the best interest of the nation and people of Ethiopia. Hence, a key underlying principle of Chinese 
assistance is also the fact that ‘business is business’ and that there are no free rides. The oft quoted phrase is ‘The 
Chinese government always believes in the vision that it is better to teach a man how to fish rather than to give 
him fish in providing aid and carrying out cooperation’.1 The impression created is that as a result of its rapid 
economic development, China has been able to develop practical and affordable technological solutions that it is 
willing to share with its development partners (e.g. infrastructure development and food security). It is also 
willing to provide access to its immensely huge market of 1.3 billion people through its zero-tariff treatment to 
over 460 products from Ethiopia. As mentioned earlier, there is no evidence available to indicate that Ethiopian 
firms have made any headway in China. What is available though – albeit from Chinese sources – are figures on 
the rapid increase in overall trade between the two countries in recent years. These do not, however, specify 
Ethiopian exports to China. Critics of China in Ethiopia point to the fact that such trade is usually ‘one-way 
traffic’ and that Ethiopian goods and firms stand little chance of making use of China’s enormous market. 
According to D. Banik, the author argued that the discourse on development and poverty reduction today 
has become increasingly buzzword-driven.2 And the general impression created by many Western agencies 
involved in development aid is that the usage and application of such buzzwords on the ground, particularly in 
relation to social sectors, is crucial in the fight against poverty. But the increased frequency and ease with which 
these buzzwords are used by Western agencies and their staff stand in stark contrast to the complex challenges 
on the ground. As a result, many of these ideas – formed by the ideology of respective donors – often lose their 
analytical and political edge. Bøås and McNeill3 argue that this is due largely to the effect of the ‘economic-
technocratic nexus’ and the combination of a bureaucratic and an economistic approach to policy formulation 
and implementation. Thus, many Western donors in Ethiopia, as elsewhere in Africa, have struggled to 
operationalize such ideas when they have tried to move from theory to practice. For example, for all the claims 
of pursuing human rights based approach to development and poverty reduction, most UN agencies and bilateral 
donors struggle to identify barriers that prevent or hamper the poor from claiming their rights and to better 
understand the impact (and costs) of these barriers in the development process.4 The Chinese are, at least 
officially, wary of such development jargon. They argue that Western countries should tone down the rhetoric of 
political rights and modes of governance that African countries should adopt. Many Chinese actors characterize 
a large number of Western interventions as charitable hand-outs, and argue that the need of the hour is more 
direct action aimed at encouraging self-sufficiency and confidence, and greater support to initiatives by the poor 
themselves to climb out of poverty. 
However, in Ethiopia at least, the Chinese are not averse to using many of the same development 
buzzwords and rhetoric that largely characterizes the Western aid discourse. Indeed, an analysis of the speeches 
of two successive ambassadors posted to Ethiopia since 2008 reveals use of the following terms: ‘empowerment’, 
‘capacity building’, ‘human rights’, ‘gender equality’, ‘accountability’, ‘democracy’ and ‘rights’. Some of these 
terms are further elaborated than others (e.g. accountability and capacity building more than human rights and 
democracy), and on many occasions these terms are used during events organized by civil society organisations 
and pressure groups (e.g. Ethiopia Human Rights Consultative Committee or media houses) or when new social 
initiatives are launched. Poverty, thus articulated by the Chinese, appears to be linked with human rights in that 
employment generation through infrastructure projects promotes the basic right to work; building schools 
promotes and fulfils the right to education, and public health facilities (including treatment of specific diseases) 
guarantee the human rights of life and health. And yet a senior Western donor representative argued that the 
Chinese, by not providing budget support and their extremely limited funding social sector projects, cannot claim 
to make significant contributions to national poverty reduction strategies; their efforts can at best be very indirect: 
‘The Chinese cannot help Ethiopia in a finance crisis’. 
Another set of criticisms of the impact of Chinese aid on poverty reduction is the absence of a Chinese 
                                                           
1 China’s Ambassador to Malawi (10), supra note 48. 
2 D. Banik, Poverty and Elusive Development, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 2010. 
3 M. Bøås and D. McNeill (eds), Global Institutions and Development: Framing the World? London: Routledge, 2004. 
4 D. Banik, ‘Support for Human Rights-Based Development: Reflections on the Malawian Experience’, The International Journal of Human 
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‘development constituency’, i.e. development line ministries, large and influential NGOs and pressure groups 
that constantly highlight the poverty reduction component in ODA.1 Thus, the amount of space available for 
independent pressure groups to be used as a resource for Chinese policymakers both in China and in aid recipient 
countries appears limited or non-existent. And while there are a handful of semi-independent groups in China 
working on development, their ability to balance powerful commercial interests in limited and their views 
usually fall in line with the Chinese political leadership.2 The Chinese embassy in Ethiopia has, however, been 
quite active in courting the support of major civil society organisations (including human rights groups) and the 
media. For example, the ambassador has given keynote speeches on various occasions and many civil society 
organisations and media representatives have visited China and attended seminars and conferences. 
 
4. Chinese Development Assistance to Ethiopia: Opportunities and Challenges  
4.1- Opportunities for Ethiopia  
4.1.1 Infrastructure Development 
The development assistance from China to Ethiopia is hailed as the answer to Ethiopia’s key economic 
challenges, especially in the country’s massive infrastructure deficit. The provision and availability of well-
developed infrastructure like transport, power supply and telecommunication, is key to development. 
Nonetheless, Ethiopia’s infrastructure record is very poor and underdeveloped, which is often mentioned as an 
obstacle to the country’s development and economic growth. The country has the lowest road density in Africa, 
the total road network is 33,297 km. Telephone and internet services are also very low by sub-Saharan standard, 
with only 8.6 landlines and 5.8 mobile phones per 1000 people respectively. Accordingly, under the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) from 2010 to 2015, the Ethiopian government aimed to enhance power projects from 
2178 MW to 10,000 MW and boost infrastructure. For instance, Ethiopia aims to construct several railways, 500 
km of railway lines by 2020 as part of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of the government. The 
development of infrastructure requires capital, skilled manpower, technology, and efficient and fast delivery of 
services. The pace of local capacity is, however, very slow to meet the growing developmental needs of Ethiopia. 
In this regard, the Chinese aid to Ethiopia is indispensable. 
The Chinese development assistance is playing a crucial role in road construction, power sector and 
telecommunication sectors as noted above. Ethiopia also signed memorandum of understanding for hydro power 
potential general survey of Ethiopia with Hydro-China Corporation. In the transportation sector, currently over 
70 percent road Construction projects in Ethiopia are carried out by Chinese construction Companies. In a 
similar vein, the Chinese telecom company ZTE is enhancing the country’s communication capacity by 
providing telecom equipment. All in all, the Chinese companies are playing a pivotal role in the infrastructure 
development of Ethiopia. 
4.1.2- Alternative Development Assistance Partners 
The Chinese increased economic assistance prompted more policy options to Ethiopia and other African 
countries vis-à-vis the traditional donors by giving the country more alternative development partners. The 
coming of China to Ethiopia also promoted the attention of other emerging powers like South Korea, India, Iran, 
and the Arab Countries. The lack of strings attached with aid from China is also welcomed by Ethiopia. China’s 
“business is business” approach is welcome in comparison to with western aid providers who often link their 
contributions to the changes in the Ethiopian legal and political structure, and to the adherence to human rights 
and good governance norms. As the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia pointed out that China, has 
been one of the most dependable and generous partner and it has always offered a relationship based on mutual 
respect and mutual benefit and as such their presence would enable the Ethiopia to share their experiences. 
(MOFED 2014, Turkish Housing Investment project) 
4.1.3- Access to Market through Tariff-Free Exports 
In order to facilitate the integration of the poor countries into the global trading system, China launched a Duty-
Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme for the least-developed countries (LDCs) at the occasions of the first and 
second FOCAC in 2003 and 2006. With the aim of expanding LDC exports, these schemes offer duty-free and 
tariff preference market access to goods and services originating from the LDCs. This initiative from China has 
enhanced Ethiopian export to China. Currently 40 percent of Ethiopian trade is with China and Turkey. China 
and Ethiopia had an average annual increase of 36 percent from 2000 to 2011 and exceeded $1 billion for the 
first time in 2008. In 2009, China became the first largest trading partner of Ethiopia and since then exports from 
Ethiopia to China have increased over 200%. As China’s minister for commerce indicated, the trade between 
China and Ethiopia will reach US$3 billion by 2015. Thus, the Chinese trade relations with Ethiopia are breaking 
the relation with the West had with Ethiopia over centuries. However, the balance of payment is not dissimilar 
from Ethiopia’s trade relations with the West. 
                                                           
1 L. Lonnqvist, ‘China’s Aid to Africa: Implications for Civil Society’, Policy Briefing Paper 17, International NGO Training and Research 
Centre, 2008. 
2 Alden and Hughes, supra note 64. 
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4.1.4- Investment through Concessional Loan and CAD Fund 
The Chinese development assistance is often delivered as part of a larger package of investments and trade deals, 
blended with much larger non-concessional loans and export credits. In the past four to five years the Chinese 
companies, as the second and the third largest foreign investors to Ethiopia next to Saudi Arabia, are generating 
lots of employment opportunities. Especially China through CAD fund has invested around 2 billion dollars 
within the last four years, which is promoting Chinese investment in Ethiopia in infrastructures, agriculture, and 
other sectors, with particular interest in the manufacturing industry in Ethiopia. The fund has already invested in 
four big projects including glass factory, leather processing factory, cement plant, and a four-star hotel. Thus, the 
investments from China have created huge permanent and temporary employment opportunities for Ethiopian 
citizens. 
4.1.5- Human Resource Development 
Since 2001, the Ministry of Education of China has dispatched over 89 teachers for TVET training to Ethiopia. 
Ethio-China Polytechnic College aided by China has been in operation for more than two years and 10 teachers 
dispatched by the Chinese Government have joined the running of College Ethiopia. Ethiopia is also the first 
country in Africa to which China sent its volunteers. To promote cooperation for capacity building, the Chinese 
provided the equipment, materials and furnishing for the training center. Under the programs to strengthen 
administrative and civil infrastructure in the period of 2003-2013, more than 27,000 persons were trained in 
various vocational training programs, and more than 8,000 experts were seconded for on-site training. Training 
programs are delivered to develop human resources almost in all fields including tax practices, developing 
judicial systems, strengthening national police, training young diplomats, etc. The Foreign Young Diplomats 
Training Programme has since 2005 trained over 800 diplomats. Under the “International Police Training 
Cooperation Programme,” 333 courses were organized the end of 2013 providing training to 3,927 police 
officers from 18 countries. 
 
4.2 Opportunities for China and Turkey  
4.2.1- Economic Benefits 
As previously highlighted, China is getting diverse economic benefits because of their development assistance or 
investment to Ethiopia such as market potential for their products tied to loans, promotion of trade, profit-
earning of hard currency for their companies, and employment opportunity for Chinese citizens. Ethiopia could 
be a commercial launch pad for Chinese companies. The two countries are also interested in a market for their 
exports that will expand along with the rapid growth of Ethiopia’s economy. A significant portion of China’s aid 
activities in the areas of transport, power, industry, capacity building and telecommunications appears to fall 
within the scope of aid for trade, and comes as a potential source of materials including oil in the near future. 
Cooperation is used as a means for promoting China’s interests in terms of security policy and foreign economic 
policy. In this context, development assistance is also used as a foreign policy instrument in order to gain support 
for Chinese concerns in international forums and to flank the expansion of Chinese foreign trade.  
4.2.2- Strategic and Diplomatic Opportunities: As the Seat of AU and UN Agencies 
China is also using their development assistance to promote their political and diplomatic interests abroad. A 
poor, landlocked nation, Ethiopia currently lacks the vast natural resources that have drawn China, though in the 
near future the prospect for oil is high, which enhances the development assistance to higher level. Yet Ethiopia 
plays an important role in African politics because of its strategic location in the region as the seat of a 
continental political body like the African Union and other agencies of the UN as well as World Bank and IMF. 
Ethiopia is the source of the Blue Nile; it is the meeting ground between largely Muslim North Africa and the 
Christian south. Hence, Ethiopia has become a focus of China’s wider ambitions in Africa and the changes it 
signifies for the region. 
The Ethiopian government also played a major role in the creation of FOCAC in 2000 from the Africa side, 
and the second FOCAC was held in Addis Ababa in 2003. As CPPCC National Committee Chairman, Jia 
Qinglin said “Ethiopia is an influential country in Africa …and active promoter of FOCAC…and made 
outstanding contributions to promoting the development of China-Africa friendly relations and cooperation, 
which the Chinese side highly appreciates”. China in return among others constructed a new conference center 
for the African Union, which comprises a 99.9-meter-high office building and a 30-meter-high conference hall 
with a vault covering 11.3 hectares. And its cost, which is worth 200 million USD, is fully covered by the 
Chinese Government. 
 
5 Challenges of China’s Development Assistance to Ethiopia 
5.1 Tied Aid  
China tie aid. Though the Chinese do not have governance related strings, the country tie aid with other 
economic and diplomatic conditions. For instance, the variety of loans from China are tied to using Chinese 
companies and procurement of materials from China and diplomatic conditions, e.g., 70% construction and civil 
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engineering to be awarded to Chinese companies, which adversely affects wider spillover effects on local 
economies, job opportunities, and wider knowledge skill transfers. This has underbidding and out bidding effects 
on local companies because Chinese companies do have 20% - 25% and sometimes 40% of cost reduction when 
they compete for bid. The One-China policy is also another diplomatic condition to extend Chinese development 
assistance to African countries. However, as indicated in Paris Declaration on effectiveness of aid, tying aid is 
one of the main causes of its ineffectiveness. In this regard, emerging donors like China needs to confirm 
commitment to Paris Declarations by untying their development assistance; and Ethiopia should negotiate to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the losses from the development assistance. 
 
5.2 Domination and Fear of Over-Dependency 
The other risk closely following from tied aid is monopoly and fear of overdependency. Some of the Chinese 
projects are not commercially won through competitive bids. Instead, they are financed through tied aid. For 
instance, ZTE is providing 100% telecom equipment for ETC, which is the sole telecommunication operator in 
Ethiopia. Such a trend is in turn feared to create over dependency; because once the existing telecommunications 
equipment is replaced by Chinese new equipment and become operational it would be very difficult to use other 
spare parts and technology like Nokia, since the Chinese technology is not easily compatible with others. This in 
turn will sustain Chinese monopoly in this sector. Moreover, this development discourages the competitiveness 
and efficiency of developing infant local companies. Hence, the Ethiopian government needs to be cautious 
about such a dangerous trend. 
 
5.3 Absence of Transparency and Corruption 
Mutual accountability and transparency is one of the partnership commitments of the Paris Declaration and 
Busan Outcomes Documents, which are imperatives to promote accountability between donors and recipient 
countries, and other concerned by knowing who funded what and for whom, what projects are funded for what 
purpose and where. Hence, transparency is important to improve effectiveness of aid and reduce corruption. 
However, lack of transparency in aid and finance agreements is another challenge of the development assistance 
coming from China to Ethiopia. There is some information on Chinese Aid at general level because of their 
pledge at forums either China-Africa forums yet there is apparent lack of information at a country level. In 
addition, China is amongst non-DAC donors including India, Brazil and Russia that do not report their aid. 
Chinese aid is also tied to grants and take place at executive levels at the stage of negotiations. The side-stepping 
of institutions promotes corruption and undermines the good governance initiatives in Africa. As corruption is 
one of the top governance and development challenge of Ethiopia and Africa. Africa is losing 150 billion USD 
because of corruption according to AU 2003 report.  
It is important to note that both traditional and emerging donors like China do have rules that discourage 
corruption in their development assistance or aid. Yet neither seems to have rules for when or how aid or 
development assistance should be restricted when a pattern of corruption characterizes an entire recipient 
government. The global regime is also not well institutionalized with regard to issues of democracy and human 
rights in which many bilateral donors apply these conditions inconsistently. As Deborah, confessed “Neither the 
IMF nor the World Bank (nor the Chinese) apply conditionality over democracy or human rights” (2010). 
 
5.4 Insufficient Technological Transfer 
Chinese companies are criticized for excessively employing Chinese professionals. With few exceptions, 
Chinese companies do not also place locals in key managerial posts; they employ locals for the administrative 
and low paid jobs like clerks, secretaries, guards etc. Some even say these positions are left for the locals 
because the companies are not allowed to bring their own non-skilled employees. This in turn, hampers the local 
employees from acquiring new technologies and managerial skills. As a Chinese scholar put it, “…Chinese 
entrepreneurs are accustomed to bringing laborers from China and most management positions are filled by 
Chinese nationals. From an economic perspective, it is more efficient and convenient for Chinese entrepreneurs 
to recruit skilled workers in China than to train local workers”, (Li Anshan, 2007: p. 81). Moreover, almost all of 
the Chinese companies engaged in big projects conduct researches in the headquarters rather than basing it in 
Ethiopia, which in turn discourages the intended technological transfer. Most of the materials used by Chinese 
and Turkey companies are imported from them, which therefore excludes and discourages possible local 
suppliers.  
 
5.5 The South-South Development Model 
The Chinese developmental model indicated the role played by the state in regulating the economy, guiding the 
market, and reducing poverty while registering continuous economic growth. However, the Chinese 
development assistance generally comes with no strings attached; but the lack of requirements for better 
governance or social programs would mean that the availability of the Chinese aid may undermine African 
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governance. Some African states including Ethiopia attempts to define the “developmental states” partly as their 
response to East Asian and more particularly to China’s economic growth success. Chinese model of 
development showed economic growth without civil liberties or participatory democracy. The development 
model also discredits the notion that an autonomous civil society is central to development. This may adversely 
affect the democratization process in Ethiopia. 
 
5.6 Debt Sustainability 
China is providing commercial loans to African nations including Ethiopia that have just received debt relief, 
thereby sometimes forcing them back into a cycle of mounting indebtedness. However, China defends such 
allegations by its policy of debt cancellations and debt rescheduling based on indebted countries request; yet this 
might motivate Ethiopia to continue borrowing and seeking of Chinese loans, which reinforces new debt cycle. 
Besides, this scheme is only available for countries that have continued diplomatic relations with China 
(Brautigam, 2010). However, despite the good intention, if Ethiopia is not able to pay back the loans, it may 
serve as political leverage for the Chinese to advance political and economic interest as the West has been doing. 
In addition, it may exacerbate the debt crisis the country is currently facing. In this regard, Ethiopia needs to 
prepare a strategy to reduce dependence on continued assistance from China and also other donors incrementally. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study clearly showed from the analysis that the potential positive impact of Chinese aid on Ethiopia is 
significant yet not deprived of challenges. Development assistance from China has offered benefits to Ethiopia 
for infrastructural development. For instance, it has provided alternative development partners especially at this 
time of financial crisis, access to market through tariff-free exports, new investments, human resource 
developments, and employment creation, and relevant development experiences. This helps Ethiopia to sustain 
its impressive economic growth and development as well as alleviate poverty. China is proactive in its 
engagement with Africa and Ethiopia, and do have African policies, which they are implementing. There are also 
several factors forcing China to provide development assistance to Ethiopia. Consequently, China stands to 
benefit from increasing involvement with Ethiopia. Economically, there are emerging opportunities in 
infrastructure projects in roads, power, telecommunications, water resources, gas exploration, wind-based energy, 
hydropower projects, machinery and engineering goods, and general trade. China is also benefiting politically 
and diplomatically in terms of their aspirations to be regional and global leaders. China is an reemerging donor 
in Ethiopia yet China’s development assistance is comprehensive by providing variety of aid as noted above. As 
the current bilateral cooperation indicates both Ethiopia and China are said to be in their “honey moon” 
China’s types of aid to Ethiopia complement each other and they also complement and compete aid from 
traditional donors to Ethiopia. The two donors: China and the traditional donors; focus on different sectors of the 
economy with their individual projects or programmes. The traditional donors in Ethiopia focused on 
programmed sector like budgetary support, and offered support to other sectors like education, health care, 
poverty reduction through protection of basis services. In addition, they also focused on humanitarian aid as well 
as promotion of good governance, human rights, and democracy. Of course, there is also competitiveness among 
the three donors, which creates policy space for negotiation and leverage for Ethiopian government. 
China’s assistance is also characterized by relatively less bureaucratic, and fast disbursement aid regime. 
Several African countries, including Ethiopia, are using this advantage. The decision-making process in China is 
far more efficient than it is in the West. Decisions and investment recommendations are often directed by the 
government, and they are able to meet the requests from African countries faster than the traditional donors did. 
But the development assistance from China is not deprived of such challenges as tying aid, monopoly, fear of 
over-dependency, lack of transparency, corruption, insufficient technological transfer, Chinese development 
model, and debt sustainability. Hence, the following interventions are crucial and they could be implemented 
unilaterally by African countries like Ethiopia and bilaterally through the joint effort of China and Ethiopia. 
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